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"Suppressing the Mother Tongue"-AntiSubordination and the Legal Struggle Over
Control of the Means of Communication
I came to explore the wreck.
The words are purposes.
The words are maps.
I came to see the damage that was done
and the treasures that prevail.
Adrienne Rich'
Diving into the Wreck
1972
MADELEINE PLASENCIA

My comments address the engagement between language, identity
and self-esteem. I would like to comment directly on Drucilla Cornell
and William W. Bratton's piece, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic
Wrongs in Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of
Spanish.2 In their piece, Costs and Wrongs of Nativism, Cornell and
Bratton highlight the infirmities of English Only laws from an economic
and ontological perspective. The authors demonstrate the infirmities of
arguments advancing the position that English Only laws are necessary
to prevent a threat and cost to American society. Costs and Wrongs of
Nativism also speaks to the role and status of English Only laws within a
moral theory. Cornell and Bratton argue that the implementation of
English Only laws in the United States results in moral slavery.
Undoubtedly we shape language and language shapes us. For Cornell and Bratton, identity is a matter of ancestry.' The term "Latino" as
used in their piece refers to "Americans born in or descended from
Americans born in Spanish-speaking countries in North and South
America, in addition to the descendents of the Mexicans native to the
southwestern states."'4 "Anglo" means native-born - born in the United
States.5 Identity can be linked to non-volitional acts because where one
1. ADRIENNE RICH, DIVING INTO THE WRECK POEMS 1971-1972, 22,23 (1973).
2. Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 595
(1999). Comments made herein are responsive to the draft presented at the LatCrit III conference

held in Miami, Florida.
3. Cornell & Bratton, supra note 2, at 598 n.7.
4. Id.
5. See id.
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is born is non-volitional. The U.S. Census Bureau (the Census) uses the
following methodology to identify race and origin: "Race is defined as a
concept used by individuals as a self-identification of 'biological
stock."' 6 That would include "White, Black, American Indian, Eskimo,
Aleut, Asian or Pacific Islander."7 With respect to "Hispanics", the
Census instructs individuals to identify themselves in terms of origin

including "ancestry, nationality, lineage, or country of birth of the person or person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United
States." 8 Consequently, individuals of Hispanic origin can be of any
race. Accordingly, Census data categorizes Hispanics separately to pre-

vent double counting. Thus, under the new regime of identity, the categories are White Non-Hispanic, Black Non-Hispanic, and American
Indian Non-Hispanic. Cornell and Bratton share this methodology of
identity based on ancestry. 9 Identity based on ancestry is identity with-

out choice.
The second part of Cornell and Bratton's piece discusses how one
acts or how one speaks. That is a matter of volition. So which language
one speaks or how one acts is the second part to being Latino/a.1 ° The
predicate to being Latina is ancestry. I agree with Cornell and Bratton

that it is fascinating that there is no equivalent for Angla to Anglo.1
That state of being able to claim to be Latino/a triggers the moral and
legal right to speak Spanish as a Latino/a. Without the right to speak or

act in a particular manner, you have lost the first predicate, which is who
you are.
The authors refer to Jorge Luis Borges who said, "I am inseparable
from the Spanish language;"' 2 and they refer to "The Bluest Eye" by

Tony Morrison. She asked, "what, in fact, may make me a black
writer?" 13 and replied: "The ways in which I activate language and
6. Census Bureau methodology most recently posted in Falling Through the Net H: New
Data on the Digital Divide, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
(visited June 7, 1999)(posted July 28, 1998). The 1998 Census Report updates NTIA's findings
from its earlier study, "Falling Through the Net: A Survey of the 'Haves' and 'Have Nots' in
Rural and Urban America" (July 1995). See infra note 8.
7. Id.
8. "Falling Through the Net, A Survey of the Have Nots in Rural and Urban America",
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (July 1995).
9. Cornell & Bratton, supra note 2, at 598 n.7.
10. See id. at 612-16 and accompanying notes.
11. Id. at 598, n.7.
12. Id. at 676 n.347 (citing and quoting Jorge Luis Borges in an interview by Sonia Moria,
Buenos Aires, Argentina (May 1985)).
13. Id. at 677 (citing and quoting Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The AfroAmerican Presence in American Literature, in I I THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
121, 146 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990)).

1999]

ANTI-SUBORDINATION AND THE LEGAL STRUGGLE

991

ways in which that language activates me."' 4 In each of the instances
mentioned, the speaker considers the relationship between language and
identity. The interdependent nature of language and logos is essential to

the speaker."5 This was the case in Yniguez.
In the case of Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,'6 the issue

presented to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit involved Article
XXVIII, which amended the Arizona constitution to provide that Eng-

lish is the official language of the state of Arizona ("Amendment").
Further, the Amendment provided that the state and its political subdivisions-including all government officials and employees performing

government business-must "act" only in English. "7 State employees
who failed to comply with the Amendment could be sanctioned for fail-

ure to obey the law. For this reason, the state employees, for fear of
disciplinary action, or worse, losing their jobs, immediately ceased
speaking Spanish on the job.
At the time of the passage of the Amendment, Maria-Kelley F.
Yniguez, a Latina, was employed by the Arizona Department of Administration where she had handled medical malpractice claims asserted
against the state. 8 She was bilingual- fluent and literate in both Span-

ish and English. 9 Before the passage of the Amendment, she communicated in Spanish with "monolingual Spanish-speaking claimants" and in
a combination of English and Spanish with bilingual claimants."z In her
affidavit, Yniguez described the way she communicated at work:
[She] spoke English to persons who spoke only English, Spanish to
14. Id.

15. See id. at 599 n.12 (citing Benjamin Franklin as a nativist linking failure of German
immigrants in Pennsylvania to adopt "our Language or Customs" as threatening to survival of
"American" civilization).
16. 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit of Appeals, sitting en banc, declared the
Amendment unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit of Appeals, sitting en banc, declared the
Amendment unconstitutional. On March 3, 1997, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
order of the Ninth Circuit, with directions to dismiss Yniguez's action for lack of standing. The
seventy odd page opinion of the Court focused on issues of mootness (by the time the case was
tried Yniguez had taken ajob in the private sector). The Arizona Supreme Court directly disposed
of the question of the constitutionality of the English Only Amendment in Ruiz v. Hull. In this
opinion, the Supreme Court of Arizona found the English Only Amendment unconstitutional in
two respects: 1) the Amendment violates the First Amendment by depriving "limited-Englishproficient and non-English-speaking Arizonans of First Amendment of meaningful
communication with elected officials; and (2) the Amendment impinges upon the fundamental
right to petition the government for redress of grievances as secured to all persons via the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 996, 999 (Ariz. 1998)(en banc).
17. See ARM. CONST. Art. XXVIII, § 3 (repealed 1997). The particular language of the law
states: "This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no other
language."(Italics added).

18. See Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 310 (D. Ariz. 1990).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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persons who spoke only Spanish and a combination of both languages to persons who were able to communicate in both. [She] communicated in both Spanish and English to those whose command of
English was not sufficiently well-developed to understand all the
English language expressions and ideas [she] desired to communicate. At times during her job, [she] also communicated in Spanish to
persons who spoke both English and Spanish because the emotive
ideas and feelings she desired to express were most clearly expressed
in Spanish .... [She] communicated in Spanish to express otherwise

inexpressible concepts and ideas. 2
In reading those papers, I asked myself: why someone would do
that - shift between languages? You may want to exclude others, you
may want to create privacy, but you drift into English because it, too, is
familiar. 2 One drifts between both linguistic worlds- Spanish and
English words, grabbing onto this or that word-buoy to sustain oneself.
Yniguez could have spoken in English only, but chose not to. Therefore,
language is inexorably linked to who she is.2 3 Moreover, to take away
her right to "act" in Spanish takes away her whole sense of identity.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized this relationship between identity and language. 4 Maria Yniguez's statement that
her reason for speaking Spanish with bilingual persons can signify "solidarity" or "comfortableness" was both political and personal in its nature
and quality.2 5 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Amendment singled out
not one word but an entire vocabulary. "Words are not often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force." 2 6 Recognition of the
power of language to activate awareness and knowledge, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow English only speaking Arizonans to erase Spanish
(and Spanish speaking persons) from the lexicon of Americans. Nevertheless, the English Only movement in Arizona has escalated to a
national platform of intolerance.
Democrat Representative George Miller of California used a simi21. Brief for Respondent, Maia-Kelley F. Yniguez, in Opposition to Petition for Cert.,
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)(No. 95-974).
22. See id. (referring to the testimony of Jane Hill, Ph.D., a linguistic anthropologist who
testified that: "Language functions to represent emotions, manipulate social contacts, to represent
aesthetic reactions and to represent personal identity.").
23. See id.
24. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit although ultimately vacated for mootness has been
frequently referred to as the substantive opinion of the case. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed
with the result and reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in its review of the federal trial court's findings
and struck down the Amendment as unconstitutional. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998)

(en banc). For this reason, much of the discussion of Yniguez is discussed in the context of
insights made by the Ninth Circuit.
25. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 1995).
26. Id.
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lar argument to speak in favor of an exception to the English Only
Empowerment Act of 1996, House Bill 123 (the "English Empowerment
Act") exempting Native American languages.27 Representative Miller
did not believe that Native Americans should "lose themselves. 2 8 In
addressing the House he stated:
The Native American exemption, which applies to languages
spoken by the more than 557 American Indian and Alaska Native
tribes in this Nation, is important for several reasons.
First, we have a fiduciary duty, a binding trust responsibility, to
preserve Indian cultures. An integral part of their culture is the ability to speak their own languages, many of which are disappearing or
have even been lost. The tribes are making a concerted effort to revitalize their languages, and I believe that without this exemption, passage of this bill would frustrate those efforts.29
Notwithstanding the argument for the Native American exception, other
members of the House stressed their support of the English Language
Empowerment Act in tones echoing paternalism. Republican Representative Barbara Vucanovich of Nevada stated: "The English language
empowers each generation of immigrants to access the American
dream." 30 Perhaps Republican Representative Randy (Duke) Cunningham of California, the original proponent of the bill, makes the most
paternalistic and personal statement in the debate of the English Language Empowerment Act records. He appeals to the sense of the
"American family" that he perceives is threatened by overhearing languages other than English spoken in places outside the home -- grocery stores, suburban shopping malls, restaurants, schools, libraries,
bookstores, or the post office. He stated:
This [bill] is an honest attempt to combine and empower the American people, and especially those that have limited English skills to
help them....
We encourage those folks to learn, and I want Spanish-speaking or
Chinese-speaking, I want them to speak those languages at home.
This bill does not prohibit that. What the bill does, it says that the
official language of the government, of the Federal Government,
27. English Language Empowerment Act of 1996, H.R. 123, 10 4 h Cong., 142 CONG. REC.
H9738, 9750 (1996). The bill was subsequently reintroduced January 7, 1997, named after the
late Bill Emerson, former House member. Hence, the bill was again voted down under its new
short name, the "Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment Act of 1997." The Emerson bill
was tailored to exempt Native American languages from its coverage. See H.R. 123, 1 0 5th Cong,
§167 (1997).
28. 142 CONG. REC. H9738, 9747 (1996).
29. Id.
30. English Language Empowerment Act of 1996, H.R. 123, 10 4 1hCong., 142 CONG. REC.
H9738, at 9747.
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shall be in English. That empowers people..... 31
As the Ninth circuit noted in Yniguez, this case reveals the tension
between the "common bonds and a common language" and "the American tradition of tolerance."3 2 I think that it is also worth mentioning that
the political rhetoric surrounding English Only laws assumes a dichotomy of "we" or "us" (English only speakers, synonymous with Americans) and "they" or "those folks" (synonymous with non-Americans).3 3
Intolerance of diversity is not eliminated by recent technologies. Unlike
the bright future bursting off the pages of Fortune magazine, the World
Wide Web does not change everything. 34
As we enter the computer and electronic wires age, I would like to
consider the impact of English Only law on identity in telecommunications. Many use e-mail and list serves to communicate with family
located all across the country. One may become frustrated when "speaking" in Spanish through the Internet and other computer-based technologies. In composing e-mail in Spanish, for example, one can not readily
find the symbols necessary to communicate fully in Spanish. Of the
various templates made available for computerized language production,
Spanish accents and other symbols often do not match the font of the
original text in which the document was composed. The e-mail I have
drafted in Spanish often arrives to its addressee with circles where I had
placed accents. Therefore, I look like some sort of chaotic writer. What
happens to me when I write electronic mail? when I try to communicate
the way I would if the addressee and I were face to face?; a destruction
of my identity takes place. What is made available to me to communicate using words rather than pictures are only the primary colors of an
artist's pallet; and the colors may not be mixed. In that gap, one is left
to the primary colors - crayons. A destruction of self takes place
because one can not use the richness of colors available cognitively, but
unavailable on the computer.
Who you are, who one is, "who I is", is absolutely linked to how
one speaks. The beginning point of this discussion grew from note 5 of
Cornell and Bratton's piece. Who am I? I need a word to describe who
I am. At some point, I would like to revisit how words that define identity change. I would assess the effect those externally imposed identifiers have on self-identity and on self-esteem.

31. 142 CONG. REC. H9738, 9748 (italics added).
32. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 923.

33. Id.
34. See J. William Gurley, Banking the New Millenium; The Web Changes Everything,
Again, FORTUNE, June 6, 1997, at 194.

